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1 Introduction
Providing security to its citizens is considered one of the prime responsibilities of government, reflected 
in the security policy set by an elected government.  The police force is the primary branch of government
to deal with internal security issues, putting it at the center of securtity policy decisions. As a public 
service, thus retaining public good characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry, its provision is 
financed through taxation of citizens, avoiding freeridership. Although police can operate at any 
government level, the local government level is particularly interesting, because substantial heterogeneity 
is observed between municipalities regarding their police expenditures. This invokes the question: What 
drives these differences in police expenditures between municipalities?
Since police expenditures form only one part of all expenditures made by local governments, previous 
research on government expenditures can guide this investigation. There’s a long tradition in explaining 
local government expenditures, both from a theoretical perspective, by establishing public goods 
(Samuelson, 1954) and their local alignment to consumer voter preferences (Tiebout, 1956) as from an 
empirical (Bradford, Malt, & Oates, 1969) point of view. Given the coercive nature of policing, there has 
been substantial interest from the field of criminology as well. Early studies on police strength (Dye, 
1969; Jacobs, 1979), based on a conflict theory perspective, took racial and economic inequality as their 
premise and embedded this idea into the subsequent literature. Yet, the rational choice perspective on 
crime control (Becker, 1968) continued to be used by these researchers, bridging the economic and 
criminological perspective. 
This study contributes to our knowledge on police expenditures by building on recent implementations of 
police expenditure research, where panel data is exploited to reveal the impact of either politics 
(Guillamón, Bastida, & Benito, 2013) or crime and inequality  (Kent & Carmichael, 2014). Covering 
these explanations simultaneously instead of seperatly, the current analysis also adds a new element by 
including for the police work generated by traffic accidents. The present study also accounts for the 
reported sluggishness of police expenditures (Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2010). Assuming these are driven by
the long term labor contracts with police force employees, the analysis is extended in this way. 
Methodologically, the large number of Flemish municipalities (n=307) used in a panel estimation for 12 
years, allows for the efficient and simultaneous inclusion of all explanatory variables.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses the specific setting of
Flemish local governments and their police expenditures. Section 4 provides a detailed account of the 
model’s specification and the measurement of our variables. Section 5 contains the methodology and the 
results. Finally, the main findings are summarised in section 6.
2 Literature
Local public expenditures have received attention from early on in public economics. Samuelson (1954) 
put forth the lack of a market type solution in setting the level of public spending, thus prompting a 
reaction by Tiebout (1956). Theorizing how an optimal amount of expenditures for public goods can exist
for local governments through fiscal competition, lay the grounds for local expenditure research into these
dynamics. Already this first publication by Tiebout paid attention to police expenditures as a result of 
conditions associated with the locality.
Given the coercive nature of policing, the subject received attention from criminology as well. 
Criminological research on police expenditures traditionally employed either public choice theory or 
conflict theory (Chamlin, 1990). Public choice theory posits that police expenditures react to changes in 
aggregate demand through the influence of rational consumer-voters on local government by majority 
voting (Borcherding & Deacon, 1972). This view is closely related to rational choice theory as set forth 
by Becker (1968). Conflict theory contends that those in authority use their power to safeguard their 
position from groups with different and conflicting values (Muncie, 2006). Therefore, any influence is 
unequally distributed among citizens, allowing certain groups to set their preferred levels of expenditures 
(Chamlin, 1990). Conflict theory in police expenditures research specifically, tends to focus on ethnic or 
economic minorities, as was the case with some early post war criminological works on the subject, 
emerging from sociology (Jacobs, 1979) and political science (Dye, 1969).
Recently, Wenzelburger (2015) developed a theoretical framework to explain cross-national differences in
law and order policies that incorporates insights from political science and criminology, reconciling the 
multiple views on the subject. This framework is also useful in illuminating the causal relationships 
between structural and political indicators for local governments. Removing those factors set by higher 
government (e.g. legislation, institutional boundaries) and adding the police force itself, we adapt this 
model to clarify relationships for local police expenditures. Of particular interest is that most of the 
common predictors have an indirect impact on police expenditures, mediated by the political parties in 
local government.
 
Illustration 1: Local police expenditures relationships (adaptation of Wenzelburger (2015))
2.1 Politics
Fiscal policies, defined in the Hettich and Winer model (Hettich & Winer, 1984, 1988) as equilibrium 
outcomes of collective choice processes, are by definition subject to political forces. As such, police 
expenditure policies are equally likely to be determined by political forces. While the importance of 
politics has been established in public economics research, these elements have only haphazardly been 
applied in local police expenditures research and when they are, only on a limited number of dimensions 
are used. One exception is the study by Guillamón et al. (2013),who found support for partisanship, 
electoral cycles and size fragmentation affecting police expenditures in Spanish municipalities. Previous 
research on the police strength of German states also confirmed the importance of partisanship and the 
presence of electoral cycles (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2013). 
2.1.1 Partisanship
Partisanship in fiscal policy theory refers to the impact of ideological differences between left-right 
parties on policy outputs (Hibbs, 1977). Left-wing governments are expected to increase government 
spending, because they support redistributive policies and an active state, while conservative parties try to
inhibit government growth (Schmidt, 1996). Nonetheless, conservative voters can be expected to adhere 
more to law and order type policies, demanding more policing and causing higher police expenditures. 
Ultimately the partisanship hypothesis in police expenditures yielded only small (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 
2013) or statistically insignificant effects (Ruddell & Thomas, 2015; Zhao, Ren, & Lovrich, 2012). There 
is some proof, however, that neighboring localities with more conservative voters induce a rise in police 
expenditures, hinting at racial segregation and white flight processes (Ajilore, 2015). Another possibility 
is presented by Stucky (2005), whereby partisanship interacts with the crime rate and with the presence of
ethnic minorities. In those cases, partisanship acts as a mediating vehicle that is susceptible to public 
pressure regarding these issues.
2.1.2 Electoral cycle
Electoral cycle models try to identify policy changes that depend on the timing of elections (Nordhaus, 
1975; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988). Politicians do have every reason to increase police expenditures towards 
election times since police are evaluated more positively during these focusing events (Walker & 
Waterman, 2010). There is evidence from public expenditures research in the US (Bizer & Durlauf, 1990;
Poterba, 1994) and Europe (Veiga & Veiga, 2006) that incumbents increase expenditures before elections 
to secure a higher probability of re-election. The electoral cycles effect has also been found to affect 
police expenditures specifically (Guillamón et al., 2013) and police strength more generally (Levitt, 1997;
McCrary, 2002; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2013). 
2.1.3 Size fragmentation
Depending on the outcome of elections and the political system in use, local government will vary in 
coalition size. According to the Weak Government Hypothesis (Roubini & Sachs, 1989; Roubini, Sachs, 
Honkapohja, & Cohen, 1989), more fragmented governments (i.e. broader coalitions) result in higher 
levels of expenditures (Ricciuti, 2004; Volkerink & Haan, 2001). Each coalition member in a fragmented 
government negotiates to implement their policy preferences, thereby inflating expenditures to overcome 
the difficulty in reaching consensus between multiple parties. The only recent study applying size 
fragmentation on police expenditures found only weakly significant effects of the coalition size 
(Guillamón et al., 2013).
2.2 Fiscal context
Some sluggishness is often observed in police expenditures research (Guillamón et al., 2013; Kelejian & 
Robinson, 1993; Stucky, 2005; Zhao et al., 2010), pointing to some form of incremental budgeting. Yet, 
Chamlin (1990) noted that including the lagged dependent could represent structural inertia, but might 
also cover up the continued influence of unmeasured variables. More recently, incrementalism has been 
contested, both on theoretical and empirical grounds (see Anderson & Harbridge, 2010 for an overview). 
Theoretically, the concept could refer to a process as well as an outcome. Empirically, incrementalism is 
problematic because it is unclear what size of change should be considered as incremental, instead of 
exceptional. Moreover, the unit aggregation is important in identifying incrementalism. Aggregated 
figures appear to hide significant changes on a disaggregated level, thus obfuscating the true effects at 
play. These findings contributed to the decline in employing incrementalism as an explanatory concept in 
public policy and public administration research from 1990 onward (Breunig & Koski, 2012). 
Following resource dependency theory, when setting police expenditures, local government is subjected 
to budget constraints based on the revenues the locality can gather (Zhao et al., 2012). Specifically, the 
fiscal capacity of local government is found to be a strong and consistent predictor of police expenditures 
(Ajilore, 2015; Bahl, Gustely, & Wasylenko, 1978; Beaton, 1974; Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Munoz, 2007;
Kent & Carmichael, 2014; Ruddell & Thomas, 2010; Zhao et al., 2010), as are related measures of local 
revenue (Chamlin, 1990; Guillamón et al., 2013; Lyons & Morgan, 1977).
2.3 Social conflict
Based on conflict theory, some research has focused on ethnic minorities and forms of economic threat as 
processes influencing the number of police and likewise expenditures on police. Attention has largely 
been directed towards the ethnic minority thesis and results have not proven consistent over different 
studies. 
2.3.1 Ethnic minorities
In conflict theory particular ethnic groups (e.g. blacks, hispanics) are considered a threat by local 
authorities, leading to additional expenditures on police (Chamlin, 1990). Another interpretation is that 
these ethnic groups will generate more crime (Ajilore, 2015). 
Ethnicity has received a lot of interest in research on police expenditures and the majority of US research 
supports the hypothesis that police expenditures react to ethnicity (Chamlin, 1990; Holmes et al., 2007; 
Ruddell & Thomas, 2010; Zhao et al., 2010) as do the number of police officers (Carmichael & Kent, 
2014; Kent & Carmichael, 2014; Zhao et al., 2012) However, a recent US study by Ajilore (2015), 
accounting for spatial effects, found no support for the racial threat hypothesis. The study did reveal the 
spatial effects hinted at racial segregation or white flight, revealing a more complex relationship might be 
at work.
Contrary to the US study by Ruddell & Thomas (2010), their recent Canadian study (Ruddell & Thomas, 
2015) found no empirical evidence supporting the idea that racial minorities play a part in explaining per 
capita police expenditures and number of police personnel. In European research, ethnic minorities are 
equated to nationality. Nonetheless, Guillamón et al. (2013) and Tepe & Vanhuysse (2013) found 
immigrants to cause a rise in police strength, consistent with the earlier North-American research on 
ethnic minorities.
2.3.2 Economic threat
Economic threat has its roots in Marxist criminological theories and refers to differences in income and 
wealth between citizens and groups of citizens (i.e. workers versus owners of capital) (Chamlin, 1990). In
this view, the economically affluent have an interest in keeping and enforcing the status quo by 
employing more police (Carmichael & Kent, 2014). Additionally these police forces are needed to protect
assets from the poor. Carmichael & Kent only found significant effects where economic inequality, 
measured by the Gini coefficient, interacted with ethnicity, suggesting the economic threat assumption 
holds only when applied to marginalized ethnic groups.
Instead of calculating inequality based on income, the unemployed as a group can be viewed as a 
potential economic threat to the ruling class (Chamlin, 1990; Zhao et al., 2010, 2012), although no 
significant effects on police expenditures have been found resulting from variation in unemployment.  
2.4 Functional requirements
Police has a mission to combat crime. As such expenditures on police should logically react to the amount
of crime in a locality. From a rational choice perspective, citizens are aware of crime rates and express 
their demand for police services. Therefore crime alters the demand for police spending, although the 
effect is possibly driven by spillover effects of neighboring localities (Ajilore, 2015). Results regarding 
the effects of crime are mixed, probably due to the operationalization of the crime concept (Carmichael &
Kent, 2014). But even for similar concepts no consistent outcome is reported. Carmichael & Kent could 
not establish a significant effect for violent crime, while in the model by Ruddell & Thomas (2015) 
violent crime is significantly related to per capita police expenditures. For the most part, crime is found to
be a weak or insignificant predictor of police expenditures (Ruddell & Thomas, 2010).
Apart from fighting crime, police are required to keep the peace and manage public order, which will 
greatly depend on population variables (Zhao et al., 2012) and public infrastructure like sports stadiums 
(Pauwels, Noppe, & Verhage, 2012). Bradford et. al (1969) found these effects to be nonlinear in their 
study examining the origins of the rising per capita police expenditures in US local governments in the 
first half of the 20th century. Both for the aggregated average municipal spending on police as for the 
spending by four large US cities, results suggested that population density generated diseconomies of 
scale in police spending, due to rising input costs to provide an equivalent amount of safety to citizens. 
Subsequent research consistently reaffirmed the importance of population density in explaining police 
expenditures (Beaton, 1974; Guillamón et al., 2013; Holmes et al., 2007; Kelejian & Robinson, 1993; 
Ruddell & Thomas, 2015; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2013; Zhao et al., 2012). Additionally, local government 
are attuned to demographic subgroups who are potentially in need of more police services like the elderly 
and the young (Ajilore & Smith, 2011; Borge, Brueckner, & Rattsø, 2014).
Related to public order policing, police are required to intervene in traffic violations and accidents. While 
population density captures these traffic interventions (Ladd, 1992), the efforts by local government in 
traffic safety are not accounted for. Traffic victims are directly registered by the police and have proven to
be significant predictors of traffic police capacity in Belgium (Pauwels et al., 2012). Nonetheless, no 
other studies on police expenditures incorporated this variable in their analysis.
3 Empirical setting: Flemish police expenditures
The empirical analysis is performed on data for all Flemish municipalities. The following paragraphs 
expand on the context in which these municipalities operate, especially regarding local policing.
The European country of Belgium, consists of 589 municipalities and 3 regions: Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels-Capital Region. The Flemish Region has 308 municipalities and 117 police zones1. Flemish 
municipalities enjoy extensive budgetary autonomy and are authorized to decide independently on the 
level and structure of expenditures and revenues. These revenues are generated by taxation and (mostly 
unconditional) grants from higher governments, on average 38.2% and 37.9% respectively in 2014 
(Dessoy, Erauw, & Lafontaine, 2014).
The police zones were instated in 2001 with the Belgian police reform2, reorganizing the municipality's 
police, the gendarmerie and the judicial police into federal and local police units. Police zones differ in 
size from 1 to 10 municipalities per zone. The basic police service for the police zone is covered by a 
federal grant, based on a calculation of the zone's 'objective' needs in policing3. Additional policing needs 
are paid for by the municipalities. In a zone with one municipality, the police budget is set by the Mayor 
and his aldermen, together with the chief of police. The municipal council has the power to grant approval
to the suggested budget. The police budget is managed autonomous from the municipality's finances, 
although any deficits need to be covered by the municipality. Police zones containing multiple 
municipalities are financed by a similar process, only the deciding government bodies are composed of 
the mayors of each municipality for the police board and representatives of the municipal councils for the 
police council.
4 Model and variables
Currently, two main approaches on estimating police expenditures exist. On the one hand police 
expenditures are viewed in relation to general expenditures, where the dependent variable is the share of 
police expenditures in a locality's total expenditures (e.g. Zhao et al., 2010). On the other hand police 
expenditures are presented as a per capita measure, representing a cost borne by all citizens in the locality 
(e.g. Guillamón et al., 2013). This choice between a relative measure as opposed to a per capita measure, 
1 In 2001 when the police zones were created, there were 121 Flemish zones. Up until now there have been 4 mergers (2011,
2014, two in 2015) and two more are planned for 2016, which will further reduce the number to 115 Flemish police zones. 
These mergers have been accounted for in the variable NumPol.
2 KB 24 October 2001houdende de benaming van de politiezones, B.S. 30th november 2001, pp. 41169-41175
3 Law 7 december 1998 tot organisatie van een geïntegreerde politiedienst, gestructureerd op twee niveaus, B.S. 05th january 
1999, pp. 132-178
will alter the evaluation of the model on police expenditures. Fluctuations in the total expenditure budget 
can result in changes to the relative size of its constituent budgets, even when actual costs for them have 
not risen (Deller & Maher, 2006). 
The model will therefore apply the per capita police expenditures as the dependent variable. Variables are 
grouped according to the distinctions made in the literature presented above. Based on the model 
presented earlier, our primary interest is in the politics variables. Control variables, proven to be 
important can be grouped into social conflict (economic and ethnic), fiscal and budgetary indicators and 
locational variables representing border municipalities.
The theoretical model can be written as:
All variables are structured as panel data, resulting in a times series from 2002 to 2012 for all 308 
municipalities in the Flanders region of Belgium. This period encompasses two municipal legislatures.
4.1 Dependent variable
Police expenditures are represented by the per capita municipal endowment for the police zone in line 
with previous studies (Recent examples are Ajilore, 2015; Ruddell & Thomas, 2015). According to 
Ruddel and Thomas (2015), limiting the dependent variable to spending on police personnel alone 
disregards the role of civilian employees in the provision of security. Police forces have been delegating 
tasks towards these employees and not including them would form a significant limitation. Applying a 
measure of total police expenditures will account for this potential bias.
The dependent variable PolDotCap is a per capita measure in euro of police expenditures, combining 
operational subsidies and investment subsidies from the municipality to the police zone. A consistent time
series from 2002 onward for both subsidies was provided by the Flemish Government agency of the 
Interior. Other public sources of police expenditure data differ in their accounting practices, making 
comparisons across time difficult. Prior data is nonexistent, because of the installation of police zones in 
2001. Before the 2001 police reform, local police consisted of municipal police. gendarmerie or a 
combination of both. The municipal police received funds from the municipality, while the gendarmerie 
was a federally funded police force. Those expenditures cannot be matched against current figures. There 
is still some missing data for the dependent variable, which results in an unbalanced panel.
4.2 Political variables
The first political variabele, Ideo, represents the ideological orientation of the local government on a left-
right scale ranging from 0 to 10, measured by the Ideological Complexion of the Government index 
(ICG) (Perotti & Kontopoulos, 2002). We introduce this partisanship variable following (Ashworth, Geys,
& Heyndels, 2006; Geys, 2007) in their studies on local fiscal policy in Flanders. The ICG is based on 
ideological party positioning in self report surveys among local party representatives (Deschouwer, 1996; 
Rihoux, 2001). It's then weighted by the relative number of mayor or aldermen of the respective parties in
the government, to reflect the compromises made by ruling in a coalition context. Opposed to previous 
measures of partisanship in police expenditure research (Ajilore, 2015; Guillamón et al., 2013; Tepe & 
Vanhuysse, 2013) that focused on specific parties, the ICG takes the whole coalition spectrum into 
account. As reported in those studies, we also expect right wing governments to spend more on law and 
order, the coefficient for Ideo should be a positive value.
H1: Right wing governments will spend more on police.
The Party variable represents government size fragmentation, using the Effective Number of Parties 
(Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) in the local government. This measure corrects the straightforward counting 
of the number of parties with the number of seats held by that party. The result takes into account how 
power is concentrated within the coalition, with high values representing more concentrated power and 
low values representing diffusion of power. The measure is calculated by applying the following formula 







Where n = the number of parties in the government and pi = party i’s share in the total number of seats. 
By applying the Effective Number of Parties, we refine the more crude measure of Guillamón et al. 
(2013). Opposed to the results of this study, but in line with the Weak Government Hypothesis we expect 
governments with less concentration of power to spend more on police, resulting in a negative coefficient 
for Party.
H2: Less concentration of power in government will lead to higher spending on police.
Another form of size fragmentation may be present in police zones that consist of more than one 
municipality. In multi-municipality zones the negotiations between representatives in the police board and
council, could lead to different outcomes resulting from this size fragmentation. These multi-municipality
zones are identified through the NumPol variable, representing the total number of municipalities within 
the police zone of the given municipality. There have been four mergers of police zones, but only two of 
them took place in the period under study: one in 2011 and more recently one in 2014 (see also footnote
1). Other years are invariant for the whole period. Although this variable has not been tested in previous 
research, we expect it to behave according to the Weak Government Hypothesis, where more fragmented 
police zones have higher spending on police, leading to a positive coefficient for NumPol.
H3: More fragmented police zones will spend more on police.
The electoral cycle variable, Leg, is a dummy variable ranging from 0 to 5 and representing the years 
preceding an election. This dummy variable will show smaller coefficients when closer to the next 
election. The variable differs from the ones used in previous police expenditure studies, where dummies 
were introduced for each year (2013), possibly inflating results, or for specific years (Levitt, 1997; 
McCrary, 2002), possibly reducing information. The model has also been tested with these types of 
dummies, but yielded the same results. The current variable is therefore retained on the grounds of 
parsimony and the amount of information captured. The previous studies found effects just before or 
during the election year, so we expect the coefficient of the variable Leg to be positive, indicating higher 
police expenditures closer to the upcoming elections.
H4: Police expenditures will be higher close to upcoming elections.
4.3 Crime variables
In line with previous cross-sectional studies (Ajilore & Smith, 2011; Ruddell & Thomas, 2015) the model
includes crime variables. However, our model consists of a panel dataset with one-year lagged crime 
indicators, to circumvent the causality problems between crime and police expenditures mentioned in 
those studies.
Three crime variables are included. Prop, a measure of property crimes (e.g. burglary, vandalism); Viol, a 
measure of violent crime (e.g. fights, molestations, rape) and Thext, a measure of thefts and extortions. 
These crime figures for each municipality originate from the federal police's statistical office and are 
made available by the Flemish Government for the period 2000-2014. They are expressed as the number 
of crimes per 1000 inhabitants. All crime variables are lagged one year, since we expect the crime levels 
in the previous year to be used in deciding police expenditures for the current year. Although registered 
crime is dependent on the activities of police, current police activities cannot influence past registrations, 
thereby avoiding possible endogeneity. Higher crime is expected to generate more spending on police the 
following year, leading to positive coefficients for all crime variables.
4.4 Peacekeeping variables
To account for the size of the municipality and its attraction, the population density for each municipality 
is calculated into the variable PopDens. Data originates from the national statistic bureau and reflects the 
population on January 1st of each year per km2. Population density is a well established control variable in
police expenditure research and is expected to have a positive relationship.
As noted by Zhao et al. (2012), some parts of the population could require more police attention. 
Therefore we include the variables Youth and Old representing the percentage of young inhabitants (age <
20) and the percentage of elderly (age > 64) in the municipality's population, respectively. These 
percentages were calculated upon the figures distributed by the national statistical office and the Flemish 
government. Both variables are expected to raise expenditures on police, resulting in a positive 
coefficient.
An important part of police work results from keeping public order. In Belgium, soccer stadiums as an 
infrastructure generate additional expenditures to local government in this area, because these security 
costs are passed down to the municipality by law. The variable Socc1 is a dummy variable indicating that 
the municipality is home to a first division soccer stadium in the present year. Soccer season is spread 
over two calendar years, so dummies are created for two consecutive years spanning the season in first 
division. The presence of a first division soccer stadium is expected to raise police expenditures during 
the football season, leading to a positive coefficient.
4.5 Traffic
If a traffic accident involves injured parties, the police has to be called to the scene to register the 
circumstances in an official police report. These incidents are counted and available from the national 
statistics bureau. Because each reported incident reflects an effective intervention from police, we can 
assume that the number of incidents reflects the workload to the police. We express the variable 
TrafficCap per capita, to take into account the size of the municipality. Because policy makers cannot 
anticipate the number of traffic accidents, the variable is lagged by one year. Thereby assuming decisions 
are made in regard to the previous year's accidents. Although the number of incidents are reported for the 
lightly injured, the seriously injured and deaths, an aggregated measure is used. Several combinations of 
these categories and the categories by themselves were also tested in the construction of the model, but 
resulted in comparable results, demonstrating the robustness of the included variable. Since the 
aggregated measure contains more information per unit of analysis, we retained this variable. A higher 
number of traffic accidents reflects a higher workload to the police, thus raising police expenditures, 
leading to a positive coefficient for TrafficCap.
4.6 Social conflict variables
Although the unemployment rate, UnempRate, was not found to be significantly related to per capita 
police expenditures (Ruddell & Thomas, 2015), following Guillamón et al. (2013) and Zhao et al. (2010) 
we introduce the unemployment rate for the municipality in June (before the recently graduated hit the 
labor market). The unemployed are those registered and applicable for a welfare grant, i.e. those looking 
for a job. Data were gathered by Arvastat, the statistical office of the VDAB,  the Flemish government's 
administration for the unemployed. From an economic threat perspective, the unemployed as a possible 
source of conflict will cause police expenditures to rise (Zhao et al., 2010).
As there is no registration of race or ethnicity in Belgium, our best proxy are the number of foreign 
immigrants in the municipality as has been the practice in other European studies on police expenditures 
(Guillamón et al., 2013; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2013). However, most of Belgium's immigrants originate 
from the neighboring countries of the Netherlands and France, where the cultural and economic situation 
is similar to Belgium. To construct a more relevant measure, we only include foreigners from non-EU 
countries, assuming differences in ethnicity are small to nonexistent between EU countries. As our 
dependent variable is expressed per capita, we adopt the same base for the variable NonEUCap. In line 
with the racial threat hypothesis, we expect a higher number of non-EU inhabitants to generate support 
for more police spending, leading to a positive coefficient.
4.7 Fiscal variables
The revenue measures used in police expenditure studies seem to be closely related to the main revenue 
streams of the locality under study, explaining the variety of operationalizations. In this light we employ 
the same measure as Guillamón et al. (2013), the total per capita revenues for each municipality, 
RevTotCap. We expect higher revenues to allow more spending on police, leading to a positive 
coefficient. The figures were provided by the Flemish Government agency of the Interior.
We include the per capita net taxable income (NTICap) as a measure of the wealth of the municipality, 
which is a very common variable in (police) expenditure research as shown earlier (supra title 2.2). The 
net taxable income is used as the base for the added income tax, one of the main sources of income for 
Flemish municipalities. Since tariffs of this added tax differ, we use the taxable income and not the actual 
income received by the municipality. The variable thus represents the potential income of the local 
government and the wealth of its citizens. The variable is lagged by 2 years, because taxation is imposed 
on the previous year income and it takes about a year to transfer the funds from the (federal) tax 
collection agency to the municipality. We expect that richer municipalities have higher police 
expenditures, resulting in a positive coefficient for NTICap.
PersTot is the total number of FTE (Full Time Equivalent) employees in the police zone and accounts for 
the sluggishness in expenditures. Most employees have long term contracts and wage expenses make up 
85.8 % of total police expenditures (Dessoy, Erauw, & Govaert, 2014). Therefore we lag the variable for 
one year, assuming an equivalent number of employees has to be paid the following year. The data was 
collected from publications by the federal police's statistical office. Police zones with more employees in 
the preceding year will have to cover these costs, leading to higher police expenditures in the current year 
and a positive coefficient.
5 Methodology and analysis
5.1 Estimated model
The empirical panel model to be estimated is:
Where the beta terms are the estimated coefficients calculated from every ith municipality in year t, ci is a 
vector of fixed effect constants for every municipality i and uit is the regression error term
5.2 Panel estimation results
307 out of 308 municipalities are included in the analysis, resulting in an unbalanced panel ranging from 
7 to 10 included years for the period 2001-2012 (12 years). The municipality of Herstappe was dropped 
from the regressions.4 Probably because of the missing values from 2005 to 2009  for the dependent 
variable and the missing values in the crime variables (for violent crimes and for property crimes only 1 
observation is reported). The variable controlling for the number of municipalities in the police zone is 
dropped in the fixed effects model, due to near perfect collinearity with the fixed effects dummies.
The model is significantly different from the intercept-only model and explains 21.38 % of the variance in
police per capita police expenditures. The Hausman test significantly rejects the null hypothesis of 
4 Herstappe is a classic outlier in Flemish datasets. See for example (Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006, p. 2289)
similarity of fixed and random effects models, so the fixed effect model is retained5.
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = PanMod10, data = pPolEx, subset = Year %in% 
    2001:2012, effect = "individual", model = "within")
Unbalanced Panel: n=307, T=7-10, N=3026
Residuals :
     Min.   1st Qu.    Median   3rd Qu.      Max. 
-115.0000   -4.5200    0.0419    4.7400  156.0000 
Coefficients :
                      Estimate  Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)    
Ideo                 -0.140362    0.711854 -0.1972  0.843704    
Party                 0.203135    0.849585  0.2391  0.811047    
lag(NTICap, 2)        1.077787    0.208400  5.1717 2.489e-07 ***
NonEUCap            712.983045  120.679701  5.9081 3.895e-09 ***
UnempRate          -261.255267   85.645499 -3.0504  0.002307 ** 
lag(Thext, 1)         0.080412    0.067929  1.1838  0.236609    
lag(Prop, 1)         -0.081864    0.155953 -0.5249  0.599675    
lag(Viol, 1)          0.204030    0.263134  0.7754  0.438180    
Old                 116.762091   54.733077  2.1333  0.032990 *  
Youth               -49.444298   63.722110 -0.7759  0.437854    
Socc1                 1.080331    2.936289  0.3679  0.712959    
Leg                   0.013986    0.135377  0.1033  0.917723    
lag(PersTot, 1)       0.093071    0.028872  3.2236  0.001281 ** 
lag(RevTotCap, 1)     0.011003    0.002499  4.4031 1.109e-05 ***
PopDens               0.072590    0.022444  3.2343  0.001234 ** 
lag(TrafficCap, 1)  115.921052  174.231620  0.6653  0.505898    
---
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares:    548870
Residual Sum of Squares: 417480
R-Squared      :  0.23937 
      Adj. R-Squared :  0.21382 
F-statistic: 53.1652 on 16 and 2703 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16
Hausman test
chisq = 226.46, df = 16, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent
The political variables Ideo, Party and Leg are all insignificant. The same goes for all variables related to 
the explicit function of the police. Only the population density variable PopDens is significantly, although
weakly, related to police expenditures. For every extra citizen per km2, we find a 7 eurocent increase in 
police spending per capita (or equivalently, a €7 increase/100 inhabitants).
The model reaffirms the importance of a number of well established determinants. The largest effect is 
found regarding the number of foreign born residents per capita. When the relative number of foreigners 
is higher, police spending tends to be much higher too. We see an additional spending on police of almost 
€713 per capita for 1 more foreigner per capita. Fiscal capacity variables like per capita net taxable 
income (NTICap) and the total revenue per capita (RevTotCap) have the expected positive effect on police
expenditures. Each additional euro per capita from these income variables, raises police expenditures with
1 euro and 1 eurocent respectively. The significant, positive coefficient of PersTot, hints at a process of 
incrementalism, although the effect is rather small. An extra police employee only raises police 
expenditures with 9 eurocents per capita. Regarding subgroups, only the share of elderly and the share of 
unemployed show significant effects on police expenditures. 
5 The random effects model can be found in appendix
6 Discussion and conclusion
Although none of the core variables were found significantly related to police expenditures, the analysis 
affirmed that public economic and criminological explanations identified those processes driving police 
expenditures.
Our analysis shows the importance of the financial and fiscal restraints on municipalities. A larger fiscal 
capacity represented by the Net Taxable Income, showed to increase police expenditures per capita. This 
effect represents two possible processes. On the one hand, from a public economic view, it implies that 
those municipalities with a richer population, can afford more police services. On the other, it might refer 
to a richer population more in need of police protection, as put forward by criminological approaches to 
the subject. Given the effects of the employment rate and those of the total revenue per capita, preference 
is given to the public economic interpretation. Where, from a criminological point of view, we expected 
the unemployed to be a possible threat to the establishment, the analysis shows a negative effect on police
expenditures. These unemployed are not contributing to the municipality's revenues, thus restricting 
police expenditures.
While we use 3 crime figures to estimate the effect on police expenditures, these counts do not reflect the 
actual harm caused by the acts, nor do they reflect the total cost to society. Police expenditures might 
react to these harms and costs, although it remains difficult to establish their exact size (Correa, 2005).   
Given the spatial effects reported by, for example, Ajilore (2015) the present study should be extended to 
a spatial panel methodology, teasing out direct and indirect effects on police expenditures.
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Appendix A: Random Effect Model
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model 
   (Swamy-Arora's transformation)
Call:
plm(formula = PanMod10, data = pPolEx, subset = Year %in% 
    2001:2012, effect = "individual", model = "random")
Unbalanced Panel: n=307, T=7-10, N=3026
Effects:
                 var std.dev share
idiosyncratic 154.45   12.43 0.478
individual    168.77   12.99 0.522
theta  : 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max. 
 0.6600  0.7104  0.7104  0.7086  0.7104  0.7104 
Residuals :
    Min.  1st Qu.   Median     Mean  3rd Qu.     Max. 
-103.000   -5.980   -0.469   -0.001    5.150  158.000 
Coefficients :
                   Estimate  Std. Error t-value  Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)         1.3151e+00  1.5799e+01  0.0832 0.9336655    
Ideo               -6.2738e-01  6.4641e-01 -0.9706 0.3318391    
Party              -4.7904e-01  7.7273e-01 -0.6199 0.5353504    
NumPol             -3.5888e+00  4.7751e-01 -7.5155 7.434e-14 ***
lag(NTICap, 2)      6.9751e-01  1.7610e-01  3.9610 7.638e-05 ***
NonEUCap            5.7479e+02  8.3437e+01  6.8890 6.817e-12 ***
UnempRate          -1.0872e+02  7.8171e+01 -1.3908 0.1643755    
lag(Thext, 1)       3.7884e-01  5.8464e-02  6.4799 1.068e-10 ***
lag(Prop, 1)        2.8723e-01  1.5465e-01  1.8573 0.0633688 .  
lag(Viol, 1)        4.1866e-01  2.5148e-01  1.6648 0.0960517 .  
Old                 2.9627e+02  3.6394e+01  8.1407 5.691e-16 ***
Youth              -8.7530e+01  4.5639e+01 -1.9179 0.0552220 .  
Socc1               3.7263e+00  2.6677e+00  1.3968 0.1625803    
Leg                 3.2995e-02  1.4002e-01  0.2356 0.8137330    
lag(PersTot, 1)     5.3923e-02  6.3541e-03  8.4863 < 2.2e-16 ***
lag(RevTotCap, 1)   2.5550e-02  2.1903e-03 11.6653 < 2.2e-16 ***
PopDens             7.9807e-03  2.2366e-03  3.5683 0.0003649 ***
lag(TrafficCap, 1)  2.9730e+02  1.6784e+02  1.7713 0.0766107 .  
---
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Total Sum of Squares:    880140
Residual Sum of Squares: 499490
R-Squared      :  0.43249 
      Adj. R-Squared :  0.42991 
F-statistic: 134.842 on 17 and 3008 DF, p-value: < 2.22e-16
Appendix B: Variable descriptives (All years and municipalities)
PolDotCap Ideo Party NumPol NTICap NonEUCap
Min. : 0.9592 Min. :2.500 Min. :1.000 Min. : 1.000 Min. : 4.631 Min. :0.000000
1st Qu.: 61.1148 1st Qu.:4.450 1st Qu.:1.000 1st Qu.: 2.000 1st Qu.:12.967 1st Qu.:0.003504
Median : 74.2108 Median :5.088 Median :1.690 Median : 3.000 Median :14.738 Median :0.005990
Mean : 82.9028 Mean :5.001 Mean :1.649 Mean : 3.565 Mean :14.815 Mean :0.009616
3rd Qu.: 90.8856 3rd Qu.:5.438 3rd Qu.:1.960 3rd Qu.: 5.000 3rd Qu.:16.519 3rd Qu.:0.010551
Max. :317.0039 Max. :6.500 Max. :4.455 Max. :10.000 Max. :44.451 Max. :0.100586
PolDotCap Ideo Party NumPol NTICap NonEUCap
NA's :321 NA :0 NA : NA :0 NA :0 NA :0
UnempRate Thext Prop Viol Old Youth
Min. :0.006494 Min. : 2.957 Min. : 1.012 Min. : 0.5222 Min. :0.0750 Min. :0.08235
1st Qu.:0.014973 1st Qu.: 14.385 1st Qu.: 5.716 1st Qu.: 3.0522 1st Qu.:0.1619 1st Qu.:0.21433
Median :0.018512 Median : 19.654 Median : 7.418 Median : 4.0300 Median :0.1746 Median :0.22546
Mean :0.019733 Mean : 22.862 Mean : 8.081 Mean : 4.5673 Mean :0.1749 Mean :0.22516
3rd Qu.:0.023241 3rd Qu.: 27.590 3rd Qu.: 9.674 3rd Qu.: 5.4353 3rd Qu.:0.1874 3rd Qu.:0.23700
Max. :0.059434 Max. :130.987 Max. :34.011 Max. :19.5561 Max. :0.3109 Max. :0.29128
NA :0 NA's :5 NA's :11 NA's :11 NA :0 NA :0
Socc1 Leg PersTot RevTotCap PopDens TrafficCap
Min. :0.00000 Min. :0.0 Min. : 14.50 Min. : 14.93 Min. : 51.34 Min. :0.000000
1st Qu.:0.00000 1st Qu.:1.0 1st Qu.: 67.19 1st Qu.: 865.13 1st Qu.: 250.79 1st Qu.:0.004433
Median :0.00000 Median :2.5 Median : 92.14 Median : 982.59 Median : 386.25 Median :0.005842
Mean :0.03869 Mean :2.5 Mean : 122.40 Mean :1041.98 Mean : 524.36 Mean :0.006114
3rd Qu.:0.00000 3rd Qu.:4.0 3rd Qu.: 129.90 3rd Qu.:1144.20 3rd Qu.: 622.41 3rd Qu.:0.007467
Max. :1.00000 Max. :5.0 Max. :2577.00 Max. :3603.21 Max. :3230.01 Max. :0.023231
NA :0 NA :0 NA's :308 NA's :342 NA :0 NA's :13
